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Customary Constraints on the Use of Force:
Article 51 with an American Accent
WILLIAM C. BANKS∗ AND EVAN J. CRIDDLE∗∗
Abstract
This article, prepared for the symposium on ‘The Future of Restrictivist Scholarship on the
Use of Force’, examines the current trajectory of restrictivist scholarship in the United States.
In contrast to their counterparts in continental Europe, American restrictivists tend to devote
less energy to defending narrow constructions of the UNCharter. Instead, they generally focus
on legal constraints outside the Charter’s text, including customary norms and general prin-
ciples of law such as necessity, proportionality, deliberative rationality, and robust evidentiary
burdens. The article considers how these features of the American restrictivist tradition reﬂect
distinctive characteristics of American legal culture, and it explores the tradition’s inﬂuence
on debates over anticipatory self-defense and the use of force against non-state actors abroad.
The article concludes by examining how the American restrictivist tradition is beginning to
shape the United States’ approach to the use of force in response to cyber attacks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary debates over the legitimate scope of self-defence under international
lawhave takenmarkedlydifferent turns incontinentalEuropeandtheUnitedStates.
Continental European scholarswho advocate a ‘restrictive’ approach to self-defence
generally assert that Article 51 of the UN Charter permits states to use force only
after another state has launched an ‘armed attack’ of sufﬁcient magnitude to satisfy
the event threshold required for responsive military action.1 Scholars who operate
within this tradition emphasize the Charter’s objective ‘to strengthen universal
peace’ by limiting the circumstances in which states may use force unilaterally to
resolve their disputes. In effect, the requirement of an ‘armed attack’ advances this
objective by allowing states to use force without the consent of the UN Security
Council only if an act of aggression by another state has left themwith no plausible
means short of military action to safeguard their ‘territorial integrity or political
independence.’2 This vision of the Charter as a comprehensive code for the use of
∗ InterimDean;BoardofAdvisorsDistinguishedProfessor; ProfessorofLaw;ProfessorofPublicAdministration
and International Affairs, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs; Director, Institute for National
Security and Counterterrorism [wcbanks@law.syr.edu].
∗∗ Professor of Law,William andMary Law School [ejcriddle@wm.edu].
1 Art. 51, 1945 Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS XVI (1945) (hereinafter UN Charter).
2 Arts. 1(1) and 2(4), UN Charter.
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force dominates restrictivist scholarship in the civil law world. In the discussion
that follows, we refer to this venerable tradition as ‘conventional restrictivism’.
Although conventional restrictivism is by nomeans the only approach to the use of
force endorsed by continental European scholars – particularly following the 9/11
terrorist attacks3 – it continues to shape European debates over the use of force.4
Conventional restrictivism has gained relatively few converts, however, among
scholars of international law in the United States.5 When American legal scholars
debate the use of force, ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ alike tend to accept that Article 51 per-
mits states to use force in some settings that would be categorically excluded under
conventional restrictivism, including in response to imminent attacks from other
states.6 Rather than seek to constrain the use of force by interpreting the language
of Article 51 narrowly, as do their restrictivist counterparts in continental Europe,
American legal scholarswho seek to constrain the use of force tend to focus on legal
principles derived from sources outside Article 51. These principles include sub-
stantive requirements of necessity, proportionality, and cost-beneﬁt reasonableness.
American ‘restrictivists’ also emphasize procedural requirements for self-defence
such as public deliberation, transparency, and robust burdens of proof. Although
these substantive andprocedural principles donot appear explicitly in theCharter’s
text, American restrictivists argue that these principles represent binding norms
of customary international law (some incorporated into jus ad bellum from jus in
bello), general principles of law accepted by the international community of states,
and basic principles of legality that are constitutive of international legal order.
These principles are context-sensitive and subject to shifting application over time,
allowing the international community gradually to update and reﬁne the law’s ap-
plication in response to new threats to international peace and security, much as
common-law courts continuously update and reﬁne legal norms through adjudic-
ation.7 In short, the distinctive strain of restrictivist scholarship that has risen to
prominence in theUnited States, whichwewill call ‘customary restrictivism,’ seeks
to constrain self-defence by encircling this sovereign power within a web of ﬂex-
3 See, e.g., C. Kreß, ‘Some Reﬂections on the International Legal Framework Governing Transnational Armed
Conﬂicts’, (2010) 15 JCSL 245, at 248; C.J. Tams, ‘The Use of Force Against Terrorists,’ (2009) 20 EJIL 359; T.
Ruys and S. Verhoeven, ‘Attacks by Private Actors and the Right of Self-Defence,’ (2005) 10 JCSL 289.
4 See, e.g., J. Kammerhofer, ‘The Resilience of the Restrictivist Rules of Self-Defence’, in M. Weller, J. W. Rylatt
and A. Solomou (eds.), The Oxford Handbook on the Use of Force in International Law (2014), 627 at 633; J.
Mra´zek, ‘The Use of Force and Expanded Conceptions of Self-defence’, (2011) 29 Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of
International Law and Affairs 135; T. Gazzini, ‘A Response to Amos Guiora: Pre-Emptive Self-Defence Against
Non-State Actors?’, (2008) 13 JCSL 25, at 26 (‘Dealingwith self-defence . . . essentiallymeans interpreting and
applying Article 51 . . . ’).
5 See Kammerhofer, supra note 4, at 633 (reporting the results of an informal survey in which only one of 15
authors ‘identiﬁable as “US scholars” . . . comes even close to [conventional restrictivism]’).
6 See, e.g., M.E. O’Connell, ‘Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism’, (2002) 63University of Pittsburgh LawReview 889,
at 894–5.
7 See O. Corten, ‘The Controversies Over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of Force: A Methodological
Debate’, (2005) 16 EJIL 803 (discussing the relative ﬂexibility of the customary prohibition against the use
of force under the ‘expansive’ and ‘restrictive’ approaches); M. Byers and S. Chesterman, ‘Changing the Rules
about Rules? Unilateral Intervention and the Future of International Law’, in R. Holzgrefe and J.L. Keohane
(eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (2003), 177 at 180 (observing that ‘[t]he
relationship between [treaties and custom] is similar to the relationship between domestic statutes and the
common law’).
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ible principles that are reminiscent of common law constitutionalism and global
administrative law.
In this article, we delineate the salient features of customary restrictivism as it
has emerged inAmerican legal scholarship, explaininghow the tradition represents
an important alternative or complement to conventional restrictivism. We begin
in Part 1 by identifying the key features of conventional restrictivism, and we offer
some tentative theories to explainwhy theAmerican legal academyhasproven tobe
inhospitable soil for conventional restrictivism. Next, wemake the case that Amer-
ican legal scholars have developed a distinctive restrictivist tradition that focuses
on establishing various rule-of-law principles, regulatory values, and deliberation-
reinforcing procedural requirements as customary jus ad bellum. We argue that this
brand of restrictivism, which is consistent with the common-law tradition’s cau-
tious but accommodating approach to legal change, is consistent with the Charter’s
overarching purposes. To illustrate how customary restrictivism has played out in
American legal scholarship, Parts 2 and 3 highlight two areas where customary
restrictivism departs from conventional restrictivism: anticipatory self-defence and
the use of force in counter-terrorism operations against non-state actors abroad. In
Part 4, we identify a third area where customary restrictivism has made inroads
into continental legal theory and will likely prove increasingly inﬂuential in fu-
ture debates: self-defence against cyber-attacks. The article concludes by identifying
some of the possible costs and beneﬁts of shifting the focus of jus ad bellum analysis
away from the text of Article 51 toward general regulatory values and rule-of-law
principles.
2. CONVENTIONAL RESTRICTIVISM AND CUSTOMARY
RESTRICTIVISM
Conventional restrictivists assert that the text of Article 51 constrains a state’s
authority to use force in several ways. First, in the words of Jo¨rg Kammerhofer, ‘self-
defence is only allowed if and as long as an “armed attack” occurs and only to end
it.’8 Under Article 51, in other words, a state may use force solely to repel an attack
that is already in progress. Using force to prevent future attacks – even imminent
attacks – is categorically prohibited.9 Second, ‘not every use of force amounts to
an armed attack.’10 Before self-defence can be justiﬁed under Article 51, an attack
from abroad must be particularly grave in its ‘scale and effects’.11 Minor border
8 See J. Kammerhofer, ‘The Resilience of the Restrictivist Rules of Self-Defence’, inWeller, Ryllatt and Solomou
(eds.) supra note 4, at 629 (characterizing these constraints as theNicaragua consensus).
9 See ibid., at 629; M. Bothe, ‘Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force’, (2003) 14 EJIL 227, at 229–30; I.
Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963) 366 (‘It is considered that the terms “attack”,
“use”, and “resort to” imply an act or the beginning of a series of acts.’); H.Neuhold, ‘Legal CrisisManagement:
Lawfulness and Legitimacy of the Use of Force’, in U. Fastenrath et al. (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community
Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (2011) 284, at 2–85 n. 21 (arguing that the ordinary meaning
and object and purpose of Art. 51 dictate that ‘the adversary must actually have started offensive military
action’ before self-defence is permissible).
10 Kammerhofer, supra note 8, at 629.
11 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Merits, Judgment of
27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at 103, para. 195 (hereinafterNicaragua); see also O. Corten, The Law Against
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skirmishes or similar episodes of isolated violence ordinarily will not qualify as
armed attacks under this formulation. Third, ‘armed attacks can only be committed
by a state; actions by non-state entities have to be attributed to a state to count
as armed attacks.’12 In each of these respects, conventional restrictivism aspires to
sharply limit both the types of incidents that will trigger the right of self-defence
and the types of actions a state may take when exercising this right.
Supportersofconventional restrictivismacknowledgethat these limitsontheuse
of force could prevent states from protecting their people from danger in a variety
of settings.13 While states could repel serious acts of aggression by other states, they
would be helpless to prevent both sporadic small-scale attacks by other states and
9/11-style attacks by non-state actors abroad without the assistance of another state
or authorization from the UN Security Council. Conventional restrictivists argue,
however, that guaranteeing effective protection for individual human beings is not
the primary purpose of Article 51. In their view, the ‘inherent right of self-defence’
is a limited prerogative to ward off major militarized attacks that are already in
progress; it is not a general license to protect a state’s people fromany and all threats
originating abroad.14 According to conventional restrictivists, these limits on the
use of force promote the overarching purposes of the Charter by preventing low-
grade violence, threats of future attacks, and even acts of aggression from sparking
the type of large-scale international conﬂict that would entail massive casualties
and embroil the broader international community in a sustained regional or global
conﬂict.
Conventional restrictivism’s approach to Article 51 is not free from difﬁculty.
Advocates of a more expansive approach to the use of force have observed that
Article 51 characterizes self-defence as an ‘inherent right’ that the Charter ‘shall’
not ‘impair’.15 The natural reading of this language, they suggest, is that Article
51 preserves a right of self-defence that predates the birth of the United Nations
and survives in customary international law alongside the Charter.16 In response
to this more expansive reading of Article 51, conventional restrictivists contend
that the Charter narrowly codiﬁes the customary law of self-defence circa 1945 by
authorizing the exercise of this right without Security Council authorization in
War: The Prohibition on theUse of Force inContemporary International Law (2010) 403;D.Kretzmer, ‘The Inherent
Right to Self-Defense and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum’, (2013) 24 EJIL 235, at 242–4; G. Nolte and A.
Randelzhofer, ‘Article 51’, in B. Simma et al. (eds.),TheCharter of theUnitedNations: ACommentary (2012) 1397,
at 1409.
12 Ibid.; see also Legal Consequences cf the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion of 9 July 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep. 136, at 194, para. 139 (suggesting that ‘Article 51 has no relevance’
if a state ‘does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State’); Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), Merits, Judgment of 19 December 2005,
[2005] ICJ Rep. 168, at 222, paras. 146–7 (hereinafter Armed Activites) (‘ﬁnd[ing] that the legal and factual
circumstances for the exercise of a right of self-defence byUganda against theDRCwere not present’ because
there was ‘no satisfactory proof of the involvement of [the government of the DRC]’ in attacks by non-state
actors) [hereinafter Armed Activities]; Corten, supra note 11, at 160–97; Bothe, supra note 9, at 233; Nolte and
Randelzhofer, supra note 11, at 1417.
13 See, e.g., J. Kammerhofer, ‘Uncertainties of the Law on Self-Defence in the United Nations Charter’, (2004) 35
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 143, at 201–2.
14 Ibid.
15 Art. 51, UN Charter.
16 See, e.g., D. Bowett, Self-defense in International Law (1958) 184–8.
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contravention of Article 2(4) only in situations where an ‘armed attack’ has already
‘occur[red]’.17 On this reading, states may not use force in self-defence unless an
attack from abroad has already begun, and only if the attack is of sufﬁcient gravity
to constitute the type of major military action that consumed the international
community’s attention in the wake of the Second World War. Even under this
formulation, however, it remains unclear precisely how grave an attack must be to
qualifyasan ‘armedattack’.18 As the ICJhas recognized, the term ‘armedattack’ isnot
self-interpreting, and ‘treaty law’ does not furnish a clear answer to this question.19
Moreover, reasonable juristsmaydisagreeas towhetherArticle51’s expressapproval
of self-defence in response to an ‘armed attack’ should be understood to exclude by
implication a further customary right to use force to repel less grave forms of
violence.20 Ultimately, the case for limiting the use of force to grave attacks that
have already transpired is hardly water-tight.
Explaining why only violence attributable to a state may qualify as an ‘armed at-
tack’ poses an even trickier challenge for conventional restrictivism. Nothing in the
text of Article 51 expressly precludes the use of force to repel attacks fromnon-state
actors such as private militias or transnational terrorist networks. Instead, conven-
tional restrictivists typically argue that using force in self-defence against non-state
actors abroad without the consent of the territorial state is inconsistent with the
purposes of the UN Charter. Stressing that cross-border military action without
the territorial state’s consent has consequences for the legal relationship between
the two states, conventional restrictivists insist that such measures require spe-
cial justiﬁcation based on the attribution of responsibility to the territorial state.21
Moreover, allowing military intervention without either the territorial state’s con-
sent or state responsibility for a prior attack would undermine international peace
and security by increasing the likelihood of armed conﬂict between the two states.
The state where dangerous non-state actors reside might view foreign intervention
within its borders (rightly or wrongly) as an ‘armed attack’ justifying a military
response, entangling the two states in a conﬂict that would threaten international
peace and security. To avoid these problems, conventional restrictivists argue, the
term ‘armed attack’ in Article 51must be construed narrowly to cover onlymilitary
17 Art. 51, UN Charter; see also T.L.H. McCormack, ‘Anticipatory Self-Defense in the Legislative History of the
United Nations Charter’, (1991) 25 Israel Law Review 1, at 2 (outlining and critiquing this argument); I.
Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963) 273; H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations
(1950) 156, 159, 269, 792, 914.
18 Nicaragua, supra note 11, paras. 51, 64, 191.
19 Ibid., para. 176.
20 Some scholars in theUnited States have argued, for example, that a use of force in self-defense is not actually
‘against’ the ‘political independence’ or ‘territorial integrity’ of a state. See, e.g., W.C. Bradford, ‘“The Duty To
Defend Them”: A Natural Law Justiﬁcation for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War’, (2004) 79 Notre Dame
LawReview 1365, at 1376–8; cf.W.M. Reisman andM.S.McDougal, ‘Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the
Ibos’, in R.B. Lillich (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (1973), 167 at 177. But see Armed
Activities, supra note 12, para. 148 (‘Article 51 of the Charter may justify a use of force in self-defence only
within the conﬁnes there laid down’).
21 See Gazzini, supra note 4, at 27; H.H. Hofmeister, ‘When Is It Right To Attack So-Called “Host States”?’, (2007)
11 Singapore Yearbook of Interntional Law 1, at 4.
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actions that are attributable to states, not non-state actors alone.22 Given that Article
51 does not speak directly to the problemof non-state actors, however, conventional
restrictivists havebeen forced to stake their claimoncontestable assumptions about
the purpose of theCharter’s collective security regime – assumptions that have only
ambiguous support in the Charter’s text.
Enthusiasm for conventional restrictivism has been tepid, at best, in the United
States. The US government consistently has rejected each of the central pillars of
conventional restrictivism, insisting that statesmayuse force in self-defence against
imminent attacks, that attacks need not pass a threshold of exceptional gravity to
constitute ‘armed attacks’, and that attacks need not be attributable to other states
to trigger the ‘inherent right of individual and collective self-defence’ under Article
51 and customary international law.23 For the most part, American legal scholars
have also rejected the central tenets of conventional restrictivism.24 Accordingly,
few international lawyers in the United States today endorse the kinds of limits on
the use of force that continental scholars would recognize as ‘restrictive’.
Given conventional restrictivism’s poor reception in the United States, some
international lawyers outside the United States may surmise that American legal
scholarship lacks ameaningful ‘restrictivist’ tradition. Indeed, somemaybe tempted
to conclude that American scholarship serves merely as an exercise in apologetics
for theUnited States’ controversial assertions of self-defence in such diverse settings
asNicaragua (1981–86), Libya (1986),Afghanistan andSudan (1998), Iraq (2003), and
Pakistan (2011). The reality is far more complex.
Several distinct features of theAmerican legal tradition have conspired to inhibit
conventional restrictivism from making inroads into US scholarship. One signiﬁc-
ant factor has been a widespread skepticism among some American legal scholars
– informed by the political realist tradition that pervades traditional international
relations theory – about the Charter’s power to constrain state action in practice.25
Leading publicists such as Thomas Franck and Michael Glennon have argued that
the Charter occupies a “peripheral” position in international disputes over the use
of force, with ‘the concept of self-defense remain[ing] a convenient shield for self-
serving and aggressive conduct.’26 Rather than defend the authority of Article 51 in
22 See Nolte and Randelzhofer, supra note 11, at 1417 (‘[T]he preferable view still seems to be that attacks by
organized armed groups need to be attributed to a State in order to enable the affected State to exercise its
right of self-defence, albeit under special primary rules of attribution’).
23 See, e.g., US National Security Strategy 22 (2010), available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
ﬁles/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf; Memorandum of Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee,
Ofﬁce of Legal Counsel, Authority of the President Under Domestic and International Law To Use Military
Force Against Iraq, Sept. 23, 2002, at 23–33 [hereinafter BybeeMemorandum].
24 See, e.g., S.D. Murphy, ‘Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the UN Charter’, (2002)
43 HILJ 41, at 50–1; W.M. Reisman, ‘International Legal Responses to Terrorism’, (1999) 22Houston Journal of
International Law 3.
25 See, e.g., H.J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1978); E.H. Carr, The
Twenty-Years Crisis: 1919–1939 (1939).
26 T.M. Franck, ‘Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States’, 64 (1970)
AJIL 809, at 811, 835; see also M.J. Glennon, ‘The Fog of Law: Self-defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter’, (2002) 25 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 539, at 540
(suggesting that ‘international “rules” concerninguse of force are no longer regarded as obligatory by states’);
O. Schachter, ‘The Right of States to Use Armed Force’, (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review 1620, at 1620, 1635
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the face of conﬂicting state practice, scholars such as Franck andGlennon character-
ize this tensionas evidence thatArticle 51’s limitshave fallen intodesuetudeorhave
been constructively amended by new customary norms.27 The inﬂuence of Amer-
ican legal realism can be discerned,moreover, in the oft-repeated sentiment that the
ambiguous and incomplete language of Article 51 gives states free rein to deﬁne the
legitimate scope of self-defence for themselves.28 While conventional restrictivists
might bristle at this suggestion, the idea that textual gaps and ambiguities operate
as de facto delegations of lawmaking power to public authorities is a familiar theme
in American jurisprudence29 and scholarship.30 Indeed, US legal scholars tend to
prize the comparative ﬂexibility and responsiveness of administrative regulation
and common-lawadjudication relative to theperceived rigidity of a code-based legal
regime.31 Given these ingrained featuresofAmerican legal culture, it shouldcomeas
no surprise that legal scholars in the United States are generally less sympathetic to
arguments that Article 51 furnishes a comprehensive legal regime for self-defence.
Resistance to conventional restrictivism among American scholars also reﬂects
a different perspective about the function and purpose of the Charter’s collective
security regime. While conventional restrictivists tend to envision the Charter’s
provisionsasoperatingtosecurepeacefulrelationsbetweenstates,32 legalscholars in
theUnitedStatesaremore likely toviewself-defenceasamechanismforestablishing
a just world order that guarantees political self-determination and a reasonable
degreeofsecurity forallpeoples.33 Inaworldwherepeacefuldisputeresolutionoften
proves ineffective,where theUnitedNations routinely fails topreventhumanitarian
disasters, and where weapons of mass destruction and terrorist attacks by non-state
actors pose grave threats to human security, most American legal scholars have
been unwilling to accept a narrow reading of Article 51 that would privilege peace
between states at the expense of justice and security for the individual victims of
a cross-border attack.34 While American legal scholars are not alone in viewing
international law in instrumentalist terms as a tool for advancing human interests,
(observing ‘that the obligations of the Charter are widely seen asmere rhetoric, at best idealistic aspirations,
or worse as providing a pretext or “cover” for aggression’).
27 Franck, supranote 26, at 809–10; Glennon, supranote 26, at 540–1; cf.T. Rheingold, ‘StateWeakness, Irregular
Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post 9/11’, (2011) 105 AJIL 244.
28 See Franck, supra note 26, at 816 (‘How is the fact of an armed attack to be established? The Charter provides
no answer . . . ’); M.S. McDougal, ‘The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense’, (1963) 57 AJIL 597, at
600 (asserting that ‘nothing in the “plain and natural meaning” of the words of the Charter requires an
interpretation that Article 51 restricts the customary right of self-defense’); cf. N. Lubell,Extraterritorial Use of
Force Against Non-State Actors (2010), 50 (observing that it is unsettledwhether there is aminimum threshold
of severity for an ‘armed attack’ and what that threshold would be).
29 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–4 (1984) (holding that
courtsmust treat statutory gaps andambiguities as delegations to the administrative agency that is entrusted
to administer the statute).
30 See, e.g., L. Schultz Bressman, ‘Reclaiming the Fiction of Congressional Delegation’, (2011) 97 Virginia Law
Review 2009; M.H. Lemos, ‘The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation
Doctrine’, (2008) 81 Southern California Law Review 405.
31 See generally G. Calabresi,A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1999).
32 Cf. I. Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’ (1795), in H. Reiss (ed.) and H.B. Nisbet (trans.), Kant:
PoliticalWritings (1991), 93.
33 SeeM.J.Glennon, ‘TheNewInterventionism:TheSearch for a Just International Law’, (1999) 73ForeignAffairs
2; cf. J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999) 91.
34 Schachter, supra note 26, at 1628 (internal quotationmarks omitted).
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theyaremorelikelythantheirpeers incontinentalEuropetoconstrueambiguities in
the Charter’s collective security regime as permitting states to use force unilaterally
to promote human security.35 Indeed, most American legal scholars view a state’s
prerogative to protect its own people fromharm as both a sovereign right enshrined
in international law, including Article 51,36 and a sovereign responsibility derived
from the state’s basic social contract or ﬁduciary relationship with its people.37
Given these recurring themes in American legal scholarship, it is unsurprising that
leading journals in the United States regularly publish scholarship challenging the
central tenets of conventional restrictivism.
These features of American legal discourse that have prevented conventional
restrictivismfromgainingaﬁrmfoothold inAmericanlegal scholarshipareunlikely
to lose force in the near term. This does not mean, however, that American legal
scholarship lacks a discernible ‘restrictivist’ tradition. Since the dawn of the Charter
era,debatesovertheuseofforceintheUnitedStateshavebeeneverybitasvibrantand
divisive as they are in Europe, with legal scholars staking out relatively expansive
and restrictive positions on various questions regarding the permissible scope of
self-defence. In contrast to their civil law counterparts, however, the participants in
these debates tend to place less emphasis on textual exegesis of Article 51. While
American restrictivists echo their continental cousins in insisting that self-defence
‘must be interpreted narrowly’ to prevent abuse,38 they tend to look outside the
Charter for the salient narrowing principles. This distinctive viewpoint has led to
the emergence of the tradition we describe here as ‘customary restrictivism’.
One principle that features prominently in customary restrictivism, but does
not appear explicitly in the text of Article 51, is the principle of proportionality.
Proportionality analysis ﬁnds widespread application in municipal legal systems
throughout the world, and the international community has accepted the propor-
tionality principle as a norm of customary jus ad bellum that predated the Charter
and retains its vitality in contemporary customary international law. Three concep-
tions of proportionality bear special consideration.39 First, proportionality arguably
requires, at a minimum, that the means a state employs in response to an attack be
rationally related to the permissible ends of self-defence. Consequently, deﬁning the
35 See, e.g., G.P. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, Defending Humanity: When Force Is Justiﬁed and Why (2008); Bradford,
supra note 20; J.D. Ohlin, ‘The Doctrine of Legitimate Defense’, (2015) 91 International Legal Studies 119.
36 See, e.g., M. Halberstam, ‘The Right to Self-Defense Once the Security Council Takes Action’, (1996) 17
Michigan Journal of International Law 229, at 238 (characterizing self-defence as ‘one of the most, if not the
most, fundamental rights bothof individuals andof states’); N. Rostow, ‘Nicaragua:ASurreply to aRejoinder’,
(1985) 11 Yale Journal of International Law 474, at 478 (‘The inherent right of a state to engage in individual
or collective self-defense is the fundamental attribute of sovereignty, and the UN Charter leaves this right
unimpaired.’).
37 See E.J. Criddle and E. Fox-Decent, International Law’s Fiduciary Constitution (forthcoming 2016); S.P. Marks
andN. Cooper, ‘The Responsibility To Protect:Watershed or OldWine inNew Bottles?’, (2010) 2 Jindal Global
LawReview 86, at 94 (‘It is by fulﬁlling the social contract of protecting the rights of itsmembers that the state
acquires legitimacy.’); cf., E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations (Fenwick, transl. 1916), 256 (‘Self-defense against an
unjust attack is not only a right which every Nation has, but it is a duty, and one of its most sacred duties.’).
38 C.J. Fenwick, Editorial, ‘The Quarantine Against Cuba: Legal or Illegal?’, (1963) 57 AJIL 588, at 592.
39 For a discussion of these aspects of proportionality in the context of European public law, see A.S. Sweet and
J. Mathews, ‘Proportionality, Judicial Review, and Global Constitutionalism’, in G. Bongiovanni et al. (eds.),
Reasonableness and Law (2009), 173 at 174.
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permissible ends of self-defence narrowly is one strategy that customary restrictiv-
ism has employed to limit the use of force. If the permissible ends of self-defence
are limited to repelling a discrete attack, for example, states will have far less room
to maneuver than if self-defence permits a state to take further steps to eliminate
a foreign aggressor’s capacity to mount similar attacks in the future. Second, the
principle of proportionalitymaybe construed tomean that statesmust use the ‘least
restrictivemeans’ available toprevent theanticipatedharm.40 Inotherswords, states
may use force in self-defence only if less destructive measures such as diplomatic
negotiation, retorsion, and countermeasures are manifestly inadequate to avert an
attack. Third, proportionalitymaybeunderstood topreclude states fromusing force
if the costs of military action would exceed the beneﬁts. The broader the frame of
reference for cost-beneﬁt analysis – for example, themore a state under attack takes
into consideration not only the costs and beneﬁts of force to itself, but also to other
states that may be affected by its actions – themore restrictive this analysis is likely
to be in application. In each of these potential formulations, proportionality offers
a legal basis for restricting the use of force without direct reference to Article 51.
Alongside the principle of proportionality, customary restrictivists argue that
states may use force only in response to an ‘actual’ or ‘imminent’ attack. Over time,
the US government has endorsed an increasingly capacious deﬁnition of ‘immin-
ence’, treating credible threats of future attacks as ‘imminent’ even if the nature and
timing of the anticipated attacks are uncertain and, in signiﬁcant respects, hypo-
thetical. One manifestation of this expansion of imminence in practice is the US
government’s oft-repeated emphasis on ‘necessity’ as a synonym or substitute for
‘imminence’.41 Customary restrictivists, on the other hand, contend that the im-
minence criterion requires a far narrower deﬁnition in harmony with the term’s
ordinary meaning.42 Under the restrictivist reading of imminence, states may use
force only if a speciﬁcally identiﬁable attack is in motion or about to commence.
Customary restrictivists also contend that international law imposes evidentiary
constraints on states’ use of force. When states engage in anticipatory self-defence,
for example, they must take into account the quality of the evidence states use
to support the conclusion that an attack is imminent. The quality of evidence is
also important in deciding whether the use of force in self-defence would meet the
principle of proportionality. Just how solid the evidence must be to support the
use of force depends upon context, including the time and resources available to
the responding state, and the nature and severity of the anticipated threat.43 Some
40 See, e.g., N. Rostow, ‘Nicaragua and the Law of Self-Defense Revisited’, (1987) 11 Yale Journal of International
Law 437, at 453 (‘To be lawful, a responsive use of force under article 51 must aim to cure the breach that
gave rise to the exercise of the right of self-defense. Itmust be proportional, involving nomore than the force
reasonably required to cure the breach’).
41 See, e.g., BybeeMemorandum, supra note 23.
42 See, e.g., N.S. Erakat, ‘New Imminence in the Time of Obama: The Impact of Targeted Killing on the Law
of Self-Defense’, (2014) 56 Arizona Law Review 195, at 202 (‘Imminence indicates that an attack has not yet
taken place but is already inmotion or is otherwise inevitable.’).
43 See, e.g., J.C. Daskal, ‘TheGeography of the Battleﬁeld: A Framework forDetention andTargetingOutside the
“Hot” Conﬂict Zone’, (2013) 161 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1165; M. Waxman, ‘The Use of Force
Against States thatMightHaveWeapons ofMassDestruction’, (2009) 31Michigan Journal of International Law
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scholars and policymakers in the United States have suggested, however, that the
applicable standardplacesamuchheavier evidentiaryburdenonstates: establishing
imminence and proportionality by ‘clear and compelling’ evidence.44
Finally, customary restrictivism asserts that international law places additional
process-based safeguards on the use of force. For example, recent publications in US
journals have focused attention on questions of transparency, institutional checks
andbalances, anddeliberativeprocess–particularly incounter-terrorismoperations
where the nature and imminence of the threat posed by particular non-state actors
abroad is not always clear to the public.45 In American debates over the use of force,
restrictivist scholars tend to characterize these factors as bedrock requirements of
procedural due process that are anchored in both domestic and international law.
Conventional restrictivists have been known to criticize American legal scholar-
shipforfailingtotaketheUNCharter’s textseriouslyasaconstraintonself-defence.46
This characterization is not entirely without force. By and large, even the most re-
strictivist scholars in the United States ﬁnd it difﬁcult to accept the idea that the
Charter alone establishes a comprehensive regulatory regime for the use of force.
For American legal scholars, the Charter serves as a starting point for jus ad bel-
lum analysis, but other sources are primarily responsible for supplying the robust
framework of legal principles that regulate the use of force, including customary
international law, general principles of law accepted by states, and basic principles
of legality that are constitutive of international legal order.47 The fact thatAmerican
legal scholars have been more willing than their continental counterparts to draw
on these sources to construct a restrictivist approach to the use of force should come
as no surprise. This approach to jus ad bellum analysis resonates with the common
law tradition, where legal principles pioneered and championed by courts such
as proportionality, robust evidentiary burdens, and deliberative decision-making
procedures have long been considered constitutive of the rule of law.48 To com-
mon law lawyers, customary principles such as these are responsive to ‘the central
aspiration of the rule of law – the subjection of public power to controls that en-
sure it is exercised in the interests of those affected by it.’49 Much like common
law courts have developed general principles in the domestic arena to constrain
executive power, customary restrictivists in theUnited States have relied on general
44 See, e.g., M.N. Schmitt, ‘U.S. Security Strategies: A Legal Assessment’, (2004) 27 Harvard Journal of Law and
Public Policy 737, at 756–7 (discussing and endorsing the U.S. government’s assertion of this standard when
responding in Afghanistan to the 9/11 terrorist attacks).
45 See, e.g., P. Alston, ‘The CIA and Targeted Killing Beyond Borders’, (2011) 2 Harvard National Security Law
Journal 283.
46 See, e.g., Corten, supra note 7, at 813.
47 Viewed from this perspective, the principles that govern contemporary jus ad bellum have afﬁnities with
global administrative law, which plausibly constitutes ‘a revived version of jus gentium’ based on ‘norms
emerging among a wide variety of diverse actors and in very diverse settings, rather than depending on a ius
inter gentes built upon agreements between states.’ B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch and R.B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence
of Global Administrative Law, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, (2005) 68 Law&Contemporary
Problems 15, at 29.
48 See D. Dyzenhaus, ‘The Rule of (Administrative) Law in International Law’, (2005) 68 Law & Contemporary
Problems 127, at 131 (‘[T]he history of the common law of judicial review is a history of judges imposing
controls on public ofﬁcials that are not prescribed by any statute.’).
49 Ibid., at 129.
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principles of common law constitutionalism and regulatory prudence – framed as
norms of customary international law50 – to limit a state’s sovereign prerogative to
use of force.
In the sections that follow, we examine how legal scholars in the United States
have applied principles of international law outside the Charter to restrict the use
of force in several distinct contexts. To be clear, we do not make the case here that
American legal scholars have drawn directly upon common-law jurisprudence as
inspiration for customary jus ad bellum. Nor do we claim that European scholars
have neglected customary jus ad bellum as a source of legal constraints on the use of
force.51Wedoargue,however, that thegeneralmethodologyof restrictivist legal schol-
arship in the United States – with its relative neglect of Article 51 in favor of broad
regulatory principles, evidentiary burdens, and procedural constraints – resonates
with a common-law tradition that aspires to provide the law with stability and
continuity, while also ensuring that the law remains responsive to shifting societal
needs over time.52 This approach to customary jus ad bellum features prominently
in American scholarship covering a host of issues, from anticipatory self-defense to
counter-terrorist operations against non-state actors to cyber-attacks. As these ex-
amples demonstrate, theAmerican legal academy’s focus on customary jus ad bellum
to the relative neglect of the Charter’s text reﬂects a distinctive ‘common law’ sens-
ibility that marks a clear departure from the more formalist spirit of conventional
restrictivism.
3. ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENCE
In stark contrast to conventional restrictivism, American legal scholars generally
accept the idea that states may use force in some settings to protect their people
against future attacks, not merely to ward off an attack that has already begun.
Rather than reject anticipatory self-defence outright, restrictivist scholars in the
United States have deﬁned the sovereign right of anticipatory self-defence narrowly
by applying a substantively and procedurally demanding conception of customary
jus ad bellum.
US Secretary of State Daniel Webster delivered the classic nineteenth-century
statement on anticipatory self-defence during the Caroline affair of 1837.53 Con-
cerned that an American ship was smuggling weapons across the Niagara River
to Canadian rebels, British authorities entered American waters without the con-
sent of the US government to neutralize the threat. Although Webster contested
the legality of this British response, he accepted in principle that international law
50 Whether these norms meet the legal requirements for customary international law is, of course, a separate
question. See, R. Scoville, ‘Finding Custom’ (forthcoming 2016) Iowa Law Review 101 (ﬁnding that US courts
tend to consult anartiﬁciallynarrowspectrumof statepractice and opinio juriswhendetermining the content
of customary).
51 For a comparison of expansivist and restrictivist approaches to customary jus ad bellum, see Corten, supra
note 7.
52 See generally Calabresi, supra note 31, at 1–5, 163–6 (discussing these features of the American tradition and
encouraging judges to use ‘common law’-style adjudication to update obsolete statutes).
53 Letter fromWebster to Fox, Apr. 24, 1841, 29 British Foreign State Papers 1129, at 1137–8.
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would permit cross-border military action in contexts where there was ‘a necessity
of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice ofmeans, and nomoment
for deliberation.’54 This ‘Caroline doctrine’, as it came to be known, was widely ac-
cepted in theUnited States as an authoritative statement of customary international
law. Although the Caroline doctrine endorsed anticipatory self-defence as a general
proposition, it limited this right by holding that the ‘necessity’ for military action
must be ‘overwhelming’ – suggesting that solid evidencemust support the existence
a particularly grave threat. Moreover, by underscoring that self-defence would be
permissible only in response to an ‘instant’ threat, the Caroline doctrine introduced
an imminence requirement; threats thatweremerely speculativeorwould take time
to materialize would not support the use of force under this standard. At the same
time, the idea that self-defencemust ‘leav[e] no choice ofmeans, and nomoment for
deliberation’, appeared to suggest that anticipatory self-defence would be permiss-
ible only if a state were compelled to take defensive measures reﬂexively under the
kind of time pressure thatwould preclude an attempt to head off the threat through
diplomacy, economic sanctions, or other non-forcible methods.
Following the adoption of the UN Charter, conventional restrictivists contended
that Article 51 superseded the Caroline doctrine by providing a comprehensive in-
ternational regime for the use of force.55 Nonetheless, most American legal scholars
continued toassert thatanticipatory self-defencewas legallypermissible in response
to imminent threats,56 and references to the Caroline criteria continued to surface
in broader debates at the international level.57 For example, when the United States
ﬁred cruise missiles at several al-Qaeda terrorist training camps in Sudan and Afgh-
anistan following terrorist attacks against US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya,
restrictivist scholars in the United States criticized the action, arguing that further
al-Qaeda attacks were not imminent under the Caroline standard.58 In contrast, the
idea that anticipatory self-defence against an attack like the embassy bombings
might be illegal per se under the UN Charter received scant attention in American
scholarship.
Clarifying the international law of anticipatory self-defence assumed greater
urgency following the devastating terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. In its
September 2002National Security Strategy, theBushAdministrationdeclared that it
woulduse force topreventbiological, chemical, ornuclearweapons fromfalling into
54 Ibid.
55 See, e.g., J. Kammerhofer, ‘The Armed Activities Case and Non-State Actors in Self-Defence Law’, (2007) 20
LJIL 89, at 99 (expressing skepticism that the Caroline doctrine, ‘a statement on the law on the use of force
made in 1842[,] is still correct despite the developments over the last 165 years’).
56 See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 26, at 1635; McDougal, supra note 28, at 599.
57 See Schachter, supra note 26, at 1635 (observing that during ‘debates in the Security Council on [the legality
of Israel’s 1981 strike against the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor], several delegates referred to the Caroline Case
formulation of the right of anticipatory defense as an accepted statement of customary law’). In response
to the ICJ’s Nicaragua Judgment, US State Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer stated unequivocally:
‘The United States rejects the notion that the UN Charter supersedes customary international law on the
right of self defense.’ A. Sofaer, ‘Terrorism, the Law, and theNationalDefense’, (1989) 126Military LawReview
89, at 95.
58 See, e.g., J.J. Paust, ‘Use of Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond’, (2002) 35 Cornell
International Law Journal 533, at 535–6.
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the hands of terrorist organizations.59 The following year, the Bush Administration
put this strategy into practice by intervening militarily in Iraq for the avowed
purpose of, inter alia, preventing the Iraqi regime from delivering weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs) into the hands of international terrorist organizations such as
the al-Qaeda network.
Although the 2003 Iraq War has been a source of great controversy among
international lawyers in the United States, few American scholars have criticized
the action on the grounds that anticipatory self-defence is never permissible under
international law. Capturing the general consensus in the United States, Miriam Sa-
piroa suggests that in a world of proliferatingWMDs ‘it is more likely to be foolish,
if not suicidal, for a state that believed its fundamental security interestswere at risk
to wait until the ﬁrst attack.’60 While American legal scholars have acknowledged
‘that the Charter’s language should [not] be stretched beyond its intended principles
and purposes’,61 they have been equally loathe to construe the UN Charter’s pro-
visions as ‘a suicide pact’ that would categorically prohibit self-defence in settings
where grave threats such as WMD attacks could be anticipated and neutralized in
advance.62
As an alternative to conventional restrictivism’s narrow reading of Article 51,
customary restrictivists in the United States have emphasized principles of propor-
tionality, imminence, burdens of proof, and obligations of transparent, deliberative
process. In the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq, the Legal Adviser to the
US State Department,William Taft IV, endorsed this tradition in amemorandum to
the American Society of International Law and the Council on Foreign Relations.63
He acknowledged that anticipatory self-defence would be permissible only if ‘pro-
portional’ and ‘justiﬁed only out of necessity. The concept of necessity includes both
a credible, imminent threat and the exhaustion of peaceful remedies.’64 Assistant
Attorney General Jay Bybee also endorsed customary constraints such as immin-
ence and proportionality but deﬁned these principles expansively to permit action
against threats thatwerenotnecessarily temporallyproximate, but involveda threat
of sufﬁciently high probability and gravity to render military action ‘necessary’.65
Restrictivist scholars in the United States would later criticize the Iraq War on the
grounds that the imminence and proportionality requirements had not been satis-
ﬁed because theUnited States lackedﬁrmevidence that Iraq had concealed stocks of
59 See Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, available at www.state.
gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.
60 M. Sapiroa, ‘Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense’, (2003) 98 AJIL 599, at 602.
61 Ibid.
62 See Secretary of State George Shultz, ‘Low-IntensityWarfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity’, 86Department of
State BulletinMar. 1986, at 17 (‘The UN Charter is not a suicide pact.’).
63 W.H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser, Department of State, The Legal Basis for Preemption, Nov. 18, 2002, available at
www.cfr.org/publication.php?id= 5250.
64 Ibid.; see also A. Sofaer, ‘On the Necessity of Preemption’, (2003) 14 EJIL 209, at 220 (distilling a series of
factors that would determine whether the use of force is legitimate under Art. 51 of the Charter, including
‘(1) the nature andmagnitude of the threat involved; (2) the likelihood that the threat will be realized unless
pre-emptive action is taken; (3) the availability and exhaustion of alternatives to using force; and (4)whether
using pre-emptive force is consistent with the terms and purposes of the UN Charter and other applicable
international agreements’).
65 BybeeMemorandum, supra note 23, at 26–7.
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chemical orbiologicalweapons for futureuse.Nordid theUnitedStatesproduceany
credible evidence that Iraq had designs to putWMDs in the hands of international
terrorists for a future attack against the United States.66 American scholars stressed
that this evidence fell well short of the ‘clear and compelling’ evidence standard
that the United States had relied upon as the applicable criterion for self-defence.67
Some restrictivists argued further that the Bush Administration mischaracterized
customary jus ad bellum; the imminence requirement could not be satisﬁed, they
contended, without a temporally proximate threat.68
In sum, restrictivist responses to the IraqWar in the United States have tended to
focus on customary constraints such as imminence, proportionality, and burdens of
proof, rather than critiques anchored directly to the Charter’s text. To pass muster
under this approach, a state that invokes the ‘inherent right of self-defence’ bears the
burden to show that its decision-making process is substantively and procedurally
reasonable in light of factors suchas the relative gravity of the threat, the availability
of alternative tools to prevent an attack, and the likelihood that military action
will undermine international peace and security. Rather than impose a bright-line
rule against anticipatory self-defence, the US tradition of customary restrictivism
constrains state action by requiring national authorities to show that the use of
force was a strictly necessary and objectively reasonable response to a grave threat
to human security.
4. THE USE OF FORCE IN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS
AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS ABROAD
Since shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the United States has maintained that it is at
war with al Qaeda and associated groups. While the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks
crystallized the American commitment to using military force against these non-
state enemies, scholarly analysis of the use of force in self-defence against non-state
terrorists evolved in the years before 2001. Customary restrictivist approaches were
integral to ﬁnding legal authority for themilitary operations that followed 9/11, and
these approaches have becomemore nuanced as the United States’ experience with
ﬁghting non-state terrorist groups has grown.69
4.1 Evolving self-defence
Longbeforethe9/11attacks, theUSgovernmentandAmericanlegalscholarsrejected
the idea that attacksmust be attributable to a foreign state to qualify for self-defence
66 See Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelli-
gence Assessments on Iraq (7 July 2004).
67 See M.N. Schmitt, ‘U.S. Security Strategies: A Legal Assessment’, (2004) 27 Harvard Journal of Law and Public
Policy 737, at 756–7 (suggesting that absence of objections to this standard in the U.N. Security Council and
among NATO members testiﬁes to the international legal authority of the ‘clear and compelling’ evidence
standard).
68 See, e.g., Erakat, supra note 42, at 203–4, 243–7; T.M. Franck, ‘What Happens Now? The United Nations After
Iraq’, (2003) 97 AJIL 607, at 610, 619.
69 For a summary, see D. Bethlehem, ‘Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Non-State
Actors’, (2012) 106 AJIL 769.
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underArticle 51.As ProfessorMichael Schmitt explained, the international reaction
to States claiming self-defence in forceful responses to terrorism ‘evolved steadily’
before the 9/11 attacks, ‘an evolution that reﬂects a clear shift in the normative
expectations regarding exercise of the right.’70 On 5 April 1986, terrorists bombed
a discotheque in Berlin. One American soldier and a Turkish woman were killed
and nearly 200 others were injured. Fortuitous intelligence intercepts quickly sub-
stantiated the Libyan People’s Bureau as responsible for the attack.Within days the
United States responded with air strikes targeting terrorist and Libyan government
facilities, including a residence of Libyan leader Muammar el-Qadafﬁ. Although
the international reactions to the military response were mostly critical, President
Reagan announced that the United States acted lawfully: ‘Self-defense is not only
our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind themission undertaken tonight – a
mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter.’71
On 7 August 1998, truck bombs exploded at the U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania killing nearly 300 people, including 12 Americans. Two weeks later, on
20August theUnited States launched 79 Tomahawk cruisemissiles against terrorist
training camps inAfghanistan andaSudanesepharmaceutical plant that theUnited
States alleged to be a chemical weapons facility. President Bill Clinton explained
that he ordered the attacks because ‘we have convincing evidence that [Islamic
terrorist groups, including that of Osama bin Laden] . . . played the key role in
the Embassy bombings . . . and compelling information that they were planning
additional terrorist attacks against our citizens. . . .’ The President wrote to Congress
a day after the attacks reporting that:
[t]he United States acted in exercise of our inherent right of self-defense consistent
with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. These strikes were a necessary and
proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist attacks against U.S.
personnel and facilities. These strikes were intended to prevent and deter additional
attacks by a clearly identiﬁed terrorist threat.72
The President did not assert that the Embassy bombings constituted an ‘armed
attack’. Nor did he claim that the bombings were sponsored by any sovereign state.
Instead, he justiﬁed the use of force in response to the bombings by embellishing
traditional conceptions of self-defence with the values of necessity, proportionality,
and deterrence, in part borrowed from the jus in bello and reﬂective of American
conceptions of substantive reasonableness. American scholars largely supported
the international legality of the strikes based on the same regulatory values. Ruth
Wedgwoodconcluded that ‘nothing in the . . . Charter or statepractice . . . restricts the
identityof aggressors againstwhomstatesmay respond’, and that ‘theuseofmilitary
force must be tested by responsible decision-makers against a host of prudential
70 M.N. Schmitt, ‘Responding to Transnational Terrorism Under the Jus Ad Bellum: A Normative Framework’,
(2008) 56Naval Law Review 1, at 7.
71 President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation (Apr. 14, 1986), in Department of State Bulletin June 1986, at
1–2.
72 Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and
Sudan, 34Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1650 (Aug. 21, 1998).
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considerations.’73 Former State Department Legal Advisor Abraham Sofaer argued
that ‘self-defense allows a proportionate response to every use of force, not just
“armed attacks”.’74 ProfessorWedgwood agreed that ‘the use of force was warranted
to preempt terrorist action by bin Laden’s network’, and the missile strikes were
thus not a reprisal.75 Because al Qaeda had by then engaged in a ‘limited war’
with the United States, ‘the rules of engagement are carefully moderated’, but this
military response should be placed ‘within the international legal paradigm of
war, rather than unbroken peace, with a right of ongoing military action against
an adversary’s paramilitary operations and network.’76 For Professor Wedgwood,
the requirement of an ongoing threat of continuing terrorist attacks served as an
evidentiary standard to protect against uses of armed force based on pretext or
mistaken factual determinations. 77
Three years later, after hijackers ﬂew commercial airliners into theWorld Trade
Center towers and thePentagon, theUnited Stateswrote to the SecurityCouncil that
itwas initiatingmilitaryactionagainstal-QaedatrainingcampsandTalibanmilitary
bases in Afghanistan in the exercise of its Article 51 right of self-defence to prevent
and deter further attacks.78 In December 2001, the Security Council approved the
use of force against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan when it authorized
the creation of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to disarm Taliban
insurgents.79 The operational and legal battleground would quickly shift beyond
Afghanistan to the border regions of Pakistan, and eventually to Yemen and other
locations.AsAmericanlegal scholarsgrappledwiththeshiftingbattleﬁeldthat these
cross-border operations represented, they developed nuanced criteria for evaluating
compliance with international jus ad bellum.
If some legal scholars in the United States had questioned whether non-state
terrorists could engage in an ‘armed attack’ before 9/11,80 the tide of scholarly opin-
ion turned decisively in favor of the more expansive approach to non-state actors
after 9/11. U.S. scholars concluded with virtual unanimity that the international
community had come to ‘accept or at least tolerate acts of self-defense against a
73 R.Wedgwood, ‘Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden’, (1999) 24Yale Journal of International
Law 559, at 563–4.
74 A.D. Sofaer, ‘Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin
Laden’, (1989) 126Military Law Review 89, at 92. Unsurprisingly, before 9/11 some leading U.S. scholars were
not persuaded that non-state terrorists could engage in an ‘armed attack’. See, e.g., L. Henkin, International
Law: Politics and Values (1995), 126 (‘It is difﬁcult tomake an “armed attack” out of a limited, isolated terrorist
attack or even a few sporadic ones.’).
75 Wedgwood, supra note 72, at 565.
76 Ibid., at 576.
77 See, e.g., J. Lobel, ‘The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan’,
(1999) 24 Yale Journal of International Law 537, at 547 (‘unilateral attacks based on secret information gained
largely be inference’ are unlawful).
78 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the President of the Security
Council (Oct. 7, 2001), 40 ILM 1281 (2001).
79 S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001); see also A. Roberts, ‘Afghanistan and International
Security’, in M.N. Schmitt (ed.), TheWar in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis (2009), 4 at 15 (concluding that the
Security Council had earlier ‘accepted that a right of self-defense could apply to a State when it was attacked
by a non-state entity’).
80 See, e.g., L. Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (1995) 126 (‘It is difﬁcult to make an “armed attack”
out of a limited, isolated terrorist attack or even a few sporadic ones.’).
CUSTOMARY CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF FORCE 83
non-state actor.’81 Rather than focus on the source of the threat to national security,
U.S. scholars emphasized customary norms such as necessity and proportionality.
For example, Professor Sean Murphy argued that U.S. responses to cross-border
raids by Taliban insurgents in Pakistan should be evaluated based on the intrus-
iveness and gravity of the threats. Applying these criteria, he concluded that the
9/11 attacks and cross-border raids against U.S. forces in Afghanistan should be un-
derstood to satisfy the jus ad bellum requirements for an ‘armed attack’.82 Notably
restrictivist scholars such as Mary Ellen O’Connell also endorsed the idea that a
forceful response to al-Qaedawas justiﬁed based on the scale and gravity of the 9/11
attacks.83 Thus, drawing on customary principles that trace back to the Caroline
incident, American legal scholars across the expansivist-restrictivist spectrum con-
strued Article 51 to permit the use of force in self-defence, irrespective of the source
of an attack, whenever a state’s sovereign responsibility to protect its people was
manifestly ‘overwhelming’ based on the scale and gravity of the threat to national
security.84
In addition to informing U.S. scholars’ understanding of the ‘armed attack’ re-
quirement, customary norms shaped restrictivist responses to U.S. military actions
after 9/11 in a variety of other respects. Relying in part on the International Court of
Justice’s (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on NuclearWeapons, Murphy asserted that the neces-
sityandproportionalityofmilitaryactionshould takeaccountof theavailabilityand
exhaustion of non-forceful alternatives and should be limited to measures that are
reasonablynecessary to counter anattackandprotectU.S. forces.85 More restrictivist
scholars argued that a lawful use of force must also be geographically or spatially
conﬁned. O’Connell emphasized, for example, that ‘in addition to exchange, intens-
ity, andduration,armedconﬂictshaveaspatialdimension. . . . [That] there isanarmed
conﬂict in [Afghanistandoesnotmean] thatAfghanis andAmericans are atwarwith
each other all over the planet.’86 Jordan Paust echoed that ‘any conﬂict between the
United States and al Qaeda as such cannot amount to war or trigger the application
of the laws ofwar’ across the globe; instead, the use of force in self-defence should be
limited to areas where the United States was engaged in discrete conﬂicts or acted
as an occupying power.87 In these and other respects, U.S. restrictivist scholarship
in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks focused almost exclusively on elaborating
and applying customary constraints on theuse of force, treating these restrictions as
81 S.D. Murphy, ‘The International Legality of US Cross-Border Operations from Afghanistan to Pakistan’, in
Schmitt, TheWar in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis, supra note 78, at 109.
82 Ibid.
83 See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 6, at 890–3. But see M.E. O’Connell, ‘Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones:
A Case Study of Pakistan’, in S. Bronitt et al. (eds.), Shooting To Kill: The Law Governing Lethal Force in Context
(2012) (‘Anarmed response to a terrorist attackwill almostnevermeet [the] parameters for the lawful exercise
of self-defense.’)
84 Letter fromWebster to Fox, supra note 52.
85 Murphy, supra note 80, at 109; see also Sofaer, supra note 63, at 220.
86 M.E. O’Connell, ‘Combatants and the Combat Zone’, (2009) 43University of Richmond Law Review 845, at 858.
87 J.J. Paust, ‘Post 9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, The Status of
Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, andDue Process inMilitary Commissions’, (2007) 79Notre
Dame Law Review 1335, at 1342; see also G. Rona, ‘Interesting Times for International Law: Challenges from
the “War on Terror”’, (2003) 27 Fletcher Forum ofWorld Affairs 55, at 62.
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either implicit requirements of Article 51 or side-constraints on the ‘inherent right’
of self-defence.
4.2 Targeting and drone strikes
American debates over the legality of using force against non-state actors abroad
shiftedfocus insigniﬁcantrespectsas targetedkillingbecameanincreasinglycentral
pillar of the United States’ counterterrorism strategy. The United States employed
drones early in its campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. It
was not until November 2002, however, that lethal force was used, when a Predator
drone ﬁred a Hellﬁre missile that struck and killed all ﬁve passengers traveling by
car in a remote part of the desert in Yemen. The suspects includedQaed SaliimSinan
al-Harethi, wanted for his role in the 2000 suicide bombing of the USS Cole, which
had killed 17 U.S. sailors. The other four, including one American, were allegedly
accomplices of al-Harethi. Applying human rights law, the U.S. Special Rapporteur
to the Commission on Human Rights claimed that the 2002 U.S. ‘attack in Yemen
constitutes a clear case of extrajudicial killing.’88 The use of drones for targeted
killing operations began to accelerate after 2006 intelligence ﬁndings by President
Bush, and peaked after President Obama revised the ﬁndings in 2009 and 2010 to
authorize the targeting of top terrorist targets, including Osama bin Laden.
Predators and other drones have been used hundreds of times to ﬁre at targets in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, Somalia, and elsewhere. Other targeted killings,
most notably of bin Laden, have been carried out by other means outside the “hot”
Afghanistan battleﬁeld. In 2010, State Department Legal Adviser Harold Hongju
Koh gave an important speech laying out the Obama administration’s approach to
international law.89 Koh conﬁrmed that, in addition to the present armed conﬂict
between the United States, al Qaeda, and the Taliban and associated forces, the U.S.
also ‘may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under interna-
tional law.’90 Kohmaintained that the United States may use ‘lethal force, to defend
itself, including by targeting such persons as high-level al Qaeda leaders who are
planning attacks.’91 Acknowledging the difﬁculties of ﬁghting a non-state enemy
that does not respect sovereign borders and hides among the civilian population,
Koh indicated that in each case, targeting decisions would be based upon subjective
factors, ‘including those related to the imminence of the threat, the sovereignty of
the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of those states to suppress
the threat the target poses.’92 Such factors along with the principles of distinction
and proportionality are ‘implemented rigorously throughout the planning and ex-
ecution of lethal operations.’93
88 U.N. ECOSOC, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions,
Submitted to Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/3 (Jan. 13, 2003).
89 H.H. Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, Speech to the AnnualMeeting of the American Society of
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Responding to Koh’s speech, some international lawyers in the United States ex-
pressed ‘profound concern [that a] program that contemplates the killing of speciﬁc
terrorists – including U.S. citizens – located far away from zones of actual armed
conﬂict . . . violates international law.’94 O’Connell continued to assert that inter-
national law would not permit a state to use force outside the bounds of an armed
conﬂict, evenwhere there is state consent. She insisted that just because ‘the United
States is engaged in an armed conﬂict against al Qaeda in Afghanistan does not
mean that [it] can rely on the law of armed conﬂict to engage suspected associates of
al Qaeda in other countries.’95 Similarly, UN Special Rapporteur Philip Alston con-
cluded that theUnitedStates’ ‘broadandnovel theory that there is a “lawof9/11” that
enables it to legally use force . . . [in] self-defense’ anywhere in theworld ‘threatens to
destroytheprohibitionontheuseofarmedforcecontainedintheU.NCharter,which
is essential to the rule of law.’96 Other scholars and human rights groups likewise
embraced what Professor Kenneth Anderson has called a ‘legal geography of war.’97
In response, someAmerican scholars and government ofﬁcials have asserted that
self-defence as exercised by the United States after 9/11 outside the armed conﬂicts
in Afghanistan and Iraq serves as an alternate justiﬁcation for certain projections of
force, and embeds customary law constraints of necessity and proportionality onto
Article 51 self-defence. 98 Asmodiﬁedby subsequent administration statements,U.S.
policy continues to suggest that it can lawfully inﬂict lethal force against anyone
that is ‘part of’ al-Qaedaor associated forceswithout explicit geographic limitswhen
the territorial state refuses consent or there is insufﬁcient time to obtain consent.99
Professor Jennifer Daskal argues that:
lethal targeting outside a zone of active hostilities should be limited, not categorically
prohibited. It should be focused on those threats that are clearly tied to the zone of
active hostilities and other signiﬁcant and ongoing threats that cannot adequately be
94 Letter from A.D. Romero, Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, to Barack
Obama, President of the United States, 28 April 2010, at 1, available at www.aclu.org/ﬁles/assets/
2010–4–28-ACLULettertoPresidentObama.pdf.
95 Declaration of Prof. M.E. O’Connell, para. 14;Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
96 P. Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
A/HRC?14/24/Add.6 (28May 2010).
97 K. Anderson, Hoover Inst., Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare (2011), 2–3 (noting that drones disturb the
long-accepted ‘implied geography of war’ based on ‘where hostilities took place.’)
98 J.O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks at theWoo-
drowWilson International Center for Scholars: The Ethics and Efﬁcacy of the President’s Counterterrorism
Strategy (30 April 2012) [hereinafter Brennan Remarks]; E.H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Remarks at Northwestern University School of Law (5 March 2012); J.C. Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t
of Defense, Speech at the Oxford Union: The Conﬂict Against al Qaeda and its Afﬁliates: HowWill it End?
(30 November 2012) [hereinafter Johnson Speech]; C.A. Bradley and J.L. Goldsmith, ‘Congressional Author-
ization and theWar on Terrorism’, (2005) 118Harvard Law Review 2047, at 2117–23 (international law does
not limit the geographic scope of the battleﬁeld); M.W. Lewis, ‘Drones and the Boundaries of the Battleﬁeld’,
(2012) 47Texas International Law Journal 293, at 312–13 (limiting strikes to armed conﬂict zoneswould create
sanctuaries for terrorists); J.J. Paust, ‘Self-DefenseTargetings ofNon-StateActors andPermissibility ofU.S.Use
of Drones in Pakistan’, (2010) 19 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 237, at 280 (suggesting that in lawful
self-defence, targeted killings of non-state actors engaged in armed attacks can be permissible no matter
where such attacks occur); J.D. Ohlin, ‘The Duty to Capture’, (2013) 97Minnesota Law Review 1268 (no strict
geographic limits in applying IHL).
99 See Brennan Remarks, supra note 97; Holder Remarks, supra note 97; Johnson Speech, supra note 97; Letter
from Samantha J. Power, US Representative to the United Nations to Ban Ki Moon, Secretary-General of the
United Nations, 23 September 2014 [hereinafter Power Letter].
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addressed by other means. Moreover, a heightened quantum of information and other
procedural requirements should apply, given the possibility and current practice of ex
ante deliberation and review.100
Professor Daskal reasons further that the United States should be precluded from
invoking self-defence outside traditional battleﬁelds unless it has established that
the proposed target ‘pose[s] an actual, signiﬁcant, and imminent threat that cannot
be addressed by other means’; and lethal targeting is the least harmful means for
addressing this threat.101 Under this multi-factor approach to self-defence, the leg-
ality of drone attacks against suspected terrorists abroad would depend not only on
whether the proposed targets have launched an ‘armed attack’ under Article 51, but
also whether the United States could satisfy principles of necessity, proportionality,
deliberative procedures, and a robust burden of proof.
Over time, the Obama Administration has disclosed important details about the
legal justiﬁcations andprocedures that govern its targetedkillingprogram, enabling
scholars to scrutinize theprogrammore closely for compliancewith jus ad bellum.102
Beginning with Koh’s 2010 speech, jus ad bellum and jus in bello justiﬁcations for
the United States’ targeted killing program have been offered in tandem.103 Yet
the self-defence standards that have been articulated by government ofﬁcials and
academics continue to be at least as contested as any from the laws of armed conﬂict.
At this writing, debates over the legality of military action against the Islamic State
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have theUnited States seeking to import ISIS into its ongoing
global armed conﬂict with al Qaeda – a conﬂict that is not limited to any particular
location. Relying on administration policy articulated by National Security Adviser
John Brennan in 2011, military action against ISIS in Iraq or Syria could occur
without undertaking a separate self-defence analysis if the host state consents to
the use of force (Iraq) or is unwilling or unable to suppress the threat posed by
ISIS (Syria).104 Moreover, treating ISIS conceptually as part of or equivalent to al-
Qaeda arguably would allow the United States to consolidate attacks by the two
groups to establish a threat of sufﬁcient intensity to meet the ‘scale and gravity’
requirements for self-defence under the American reading of Article 51. Still, legal
scholars in the United States continue to debate various aspects of the Obama
Administration’s case for military action, including whether a sufﬁciently robust
100 Daskal, supra note 43, at 1209.
101 Ibid., at 1209, 1230–1.
102 See Brennan Remarks, supra note 97; Holder Remarks, supra note 97; Johnson Speech, supra note 97.
103 Stephen W. Preston, Gen. Counsel, CIA, Remarks at Harvard Law School (Apr. 10, 2012) (arguing that to
justify the use of force ‘we need look no further than the inherent right of national self-defense, which is
recognized by customary international law’).
104 A. Deeks, ‘Narrowing Down the U.S. International Legal Theory for ISIS Strikes in Syria’, Law-
fare blog, 12 September 2014, available at www.lawfareblog.com/2014/09/narrowing-down-the-u-s-
international-legal-theory-for-isis-strikes-in-syria/. For background, see A. Deeks, ‘“Unwilling or Unable”:
Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense’, (2012) 52 Virginia Journal of International
Law 483. Indeed, in her 23 September 2014 letter to the Secretary General, Ambassador Samantha Power
noted that Art. 51 self-defence is lawful where ‘the government of the State where the threat is located is
unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks. The Syrian regime has shown that
[it is unwilling or unable]. Accordingly, the United States has initiated necessary and proportionate military
actions in Syria.’ Power Letter, supra note 98.
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link has been established between ISIS and al-Qaeda and whether ISIS poses an
actual, signiﬁcant, and imminent threat to the United States.
Taking a step back from the speciﬁcs of these debates, what stands out are the
common themes that link restrictivist approaches to the use of force in the United
States, and how sharply these themes depart from conventional restrictivism. Re-
strictivists in the United States rarely focus their attention on the kind of formal
textual exegesis that deﬁnes conventional restrictivism. ForAmerican legal scholars
trained in a common-law tradition that seeks to preserve the law’s ﬂexibility tomeet
evolving societal demands, customary restrictivism has great intuitive appeal. As
Michael Schmitt puts it,
law must be construed in the context in which it is to be applied if it is to remain
relevant; and in the twenty-ﬁrst century security environment, insistence on a passe´
restrictive application of international legal principles . . . would quickly impel States
at risk to ignore them.105
Consistent with this vision, customary restrictivists in the United States have artic-
ulated a purposive, realist vision of jus ad bellum that makes allowance for states’
legitimate sovereign interests in defending their people from dangerous non-state
actors. This increased tolerance for uses of force against non-state actors has been
accompanied, however, by a sustained commitment to nontextual constraints such
as necessity, proportionality, and burdens of proof that are designed to limit and
legitimate forceful responses through careful evaluation of context and facts. For
customary restrictivists in theUnitedStates, these limits on theuseof force combine
clear-eyed realism about the law’s limited capacity to constrain state behavior, on
the one hand, with a ﬁrm commitment to the principles and values of common-law
constitutionalism and the rule of law, on the other.
5. SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST CYBER ATTACKS
Our ﬁnal example points toward common ground rather than cleavages between
European andAmerican approaches to a quintessentiallymodern security problem:
cyber-attacks. A form of customary restrictivism has emerged in both the United
States and Europe in the evolving legal posture for defending against cyber-attacks.
Spurred by cyber intrusions directed at Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008, recent
years havewitnessed amajor research initiative sponsored byNATO, a related series
of important conferences, and independent scholarship onboth sides of theAtlantic
addressingtheinternational legalregimeforself-defenceagainstcyberattacks.These
efforts suggest that there is considerable harmony among international lawyers on
the need for a hybrid form of customary restrictivism that would adapt responses
to cyber intrusions to both the Charter and principles of customary international
law.
105 M. Schmitt, ‘Preemptive Strategies in International Law’, (2003) 24Michigan Journal of International Law 513,
at 546.
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Developing a consensus-based understanding of the international law of cyber
conﬂict has been complicated by unique attributes of the cyber domain. Prompt
attribution of an attack, and even threat identiﬁcation, can be very difﬁcult. As
a result, setting the critical normative starting point – the line between offence
and defence – is elusive. May a state implement countermeasures in advance of a
cyber-intrusion? If attribution cannot be reliably determined, must responses be
delayed accordingly? Most notably for our purposes, it is unclear when a cyber
intrusion constitutes an ‘armed attack’ that would trigger a right of self-defence
under the Charter.
The traditional and dominant view is that the prohibition on the use of force and
right of self-defence apply to armed violence, and only to interventions that produce
physical damage. Under the traditional standard,most cyber-attackswill not violate
Article 2(4), and thus do not enable Article 51 self-defence. During the Cold War,
someStatesarguedthat ‘useof force’ shouldbedeterminednotsomuchbythetypeof
instrument employed, but rather by the effects of the intrusion, bywhatevermeans.106
Although the U.S. government has resisted efforts to broaden the interpretation
of ‘force’ in conventional conﬂicts, it appears to have embraced an effects-based
determination of the use of force norm in the cyber domain.107 The 2011 White
House Cyberspace Strategy states that ‘the United States will respond to hostile acts
in cyberspace as we would to any other threat. . . . [C]ertain hostile acts conducted
throughcyberspacecouldcompel [forcible] actionsunder thecommitmentswehave
with our military treaty partners.’108
Meanwhile,between2009and2013aremarkablyconstituted internationalgroup
of legal experts convened in Tallinn, Estonia under the auspices of the NATO Co-
operativeCyberDefenseCenter of Excellence for thepurposeof producing amanual
on the lawgoverning cyberwarfare. The experts included scholars andpractitioners
from around the world, including many from Europe and the United States. The
resulting Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare sought
to apply existing legal norms to cyber warfare.109
Remarkably, theTallinnManualanditscommentaryrevealedaroughconvergence
ofviewsamongEuropeanandAmerican legal expertsonavarietyof issues regarding
the applicability, scope, and criteria for invoking self-defence in the cyber realm. The
experts agreed that ‘whether a cyber-operation constitutes an armed attack depends
on its scale and effects’, and amajority of the group concluded that an armed attack
does not necessarily involve the employment of ‘weapons’. If the effects of a cyber-
operation are analogous to those resulting from a kinetic attack, the instrument
used to cause the effects is not critically important.110 The group also agreed that
106 M.C. Waxman, ‘Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4)’, (2011) 36 Yale Journal
of International Law 421, at 428–30.
107 Ibid., at 431, at 436–7; TheWhite House, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness
in a Networked World (2011), 14; O.A. Hathaway et al., ‘The Law of Cyber-Attack’, (2012) 100 California Law
Review 817, at 848;W. Banks, ‘The Role of CounterterrorismLaw in Shaping ad BellumNorms for CyberWar’,
(2012) 89 International Legal Studies 157, at 169–70.
108 White House Strategy, supra note 106, at 14.
109 M.N. Schmitt (gen. ed.), Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to CyberWarfare (2013).
110 Ibid., Rule 13(3), (4).
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accumulated effects fromaggregated small cyber incidentsmay constitute an armed
attack as a composite.111 At the same time, the experts concluded that the law
remained unclear on the ‘precise point at which the extent of death, injury, damage,
destruction, or suffering caused by a cyber-operation fails to quality as an armed
attack.’112 Perhapsmost interesting for present purposes, experts from both sides of
the Atlantic concurred that self-defence in response to cyber attacks is subject to
the same customary constraints that apply in the kinetic realm, including necessity,
proportionality, imminence, and immediacy.113
The experts who gathered at Tallinn did not reach a consensus on all issues
regarding the application of self-defence to cyber attacks. Like legal scholars and
practitioners generally, the expertswere divided over how jus ad bellumwould apply
to cyber intrusions that have extensive negative impacts but cause no injury, death,
or physical destruction. In this unsettled area, some international lawyers took
the view that physical harm to persons or property must exist for there to be an
armed attack. Others focused on the scale of harm to a state’s national interests,
asserting that any cyber attack that wreakedmassive harm on a state – for example,
by crashing its national stock exchange and thereby derailing its economy – would
justify a forcible response under Article 51.114 Additionally, the group remained
divided overwhether a Statemayundertake self-defence in the face of armed attacks
by non-state actors.115
Parallel with the Tallinn project, American scholars have lined up in support of
characterizing especially destructive cyber-attacks as armed attacks that give rise to
Article 51 self-defence. Some American scholars, like Professors Michael Schmitt,
Eric Talbot Jensen, and SeanWatts, support an impact analysis that would permit a
forcible response if the cyber intrusion causes harm to the victim state equivalent
to a kinetic attack.116 Others, like Gary Sharp, argue that a cyber-attack qualiﬁes
as an armed attack whenever the intrusion penetrates any critical national infra-
structure system, regardless ofwhether it has yet caused any physical destruction or
casualties.117 Thus, instead of the traditional and relatively clearer formulation of
‘armedattack’,manyAmericanscholarsnowsupportamore subjectiveeffects-based
criterion for determining whether a cyber intrusion triggers self-defence.
Some legal scholars in the United States have used the emerging effects-based
formulation of Article 51 to advocate for restrictive approaches to self-defence in
the cyber context. These scholars tend to focus on the scope and gravity of the
111 Ibid., Rule 13(8).
112 Ibid., Rule 13(7).
113 Ibid., Rule 13(21).
114 Ibid., Rule 13(9).
115 Ibid., Rule 13(17). Amajority accepted self-defense in the cyber realm against non-state actors.
116 See, e.g., W.A. Owens et al. (eds.), National Research Council, Technology, Policy, Law and Ethics Regarding U.S.
Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities (2009), 33–4 [hereinafter NRC report]; E.T. Jensen, ‘Computer
Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense’, (2002) 38
Stanford Journal of International Law 207, at 223–9; M.N. Schmitt, ‘Computer Network Attack and the Use of
Force in International Law:Thoughts onaNormative Framework’, (1999) 37Columbia Journal of Transnational
Law 885, at 930–4; S.Watts, ‘Low-Intensity ComputerNetworkAttacks and Self-Defense’, in R.A. Pedrozo and
D.P.Wollschlaeger (eds.), International Law and the Changing Character ofWar (2011).
117 W.G. Sharp, Cyberspace and the Use of Force (1999), 129–30.
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harm caused by the cyber event and the magnitude and immediacy of the threat
posed by the attacks; accordingly, they support extending the principles of ne-
cessity and proportionality to responses to the cyber arena.118 In a representative
article, Daniel Silver has argued that a cyber-attack justiﬁes self-defence ‘only if the
severity of . . . [the] foreseeable consequences resembles the consequences that are
associated with armed coercion.’119 The malleability of the foreseeability concept
enables an evolving understanding of permissible responses to cyber-attacks, but
it also sets a hard outer limit for the use of force. Common law restrictivist schol-
ars have applied necessity and proportionality to cyber-attacks in much the same
way.120 Under this application of customary principles of self-defence, military ac-
tion is permissible in response to cyber attacks only if such action is strictly neces-
sary and narrowly tailored to prevent grave and imminent harm. Thus, American
scholars have envisioned the effects-based approach to self-defence under Article
51 not only as a basis for expanding the right to use force in response to cy-
ber attacks, but also as a signiﬁcant constraint on the United States’ recourse to
force.
Boththeexpansionistandrestrictivist featuresoftheeffects-basedpositionappear
to have gained the support of the U.S. government. As then-head of U.S. Cyber
Command General Keith Alexander stated in congressional testimony in 2010,
‘[i]f the President determines a cyber-event does meet the threshold of a use of
force/armed attack, he may determine that the activity is of such scope, duration,
or intensity that it warrants exercising our right to self-defense.’121 While serving
as Legal Adviser to the State Department in 2012, Koh elaborated the ofﬁcial U.S.
positionwhenhe stated that ‘cyber activities thatproximately result indeath, injury,
or signiﬁcant destructionwould likely be viewed as a use of force.’122 Further details
about theU.S. government’s position emerged the following year in the ﬁrstwave of
leaks from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, when The Guardian published
the undated Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-20, U.S. Cyber Operations Policy. The
directive addresses ‘Defensive Cyber Effects Operations (DCEO)’ for ‘defending or
protecting against imminent threats or ongoing attacks or malicious cyber activity
againstU.S.national interests.’123 Thedirectivereserves ‘therighttoact inaccordance
with the United States’ inherent right of self-defence as recognized in international
law’, including through the conduct of DCEO, in contexts where:
118 NRC Report, supra note 115, at 253–4; D.B. Silver, ‘Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force Under Article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter’, in M.N. Schmitt and B.T. O’Donnell (eds.), Computer Network Attack and
International Law (2002), 89.
119 Silver, supra note 117, at 90–1.
120 SeeWaxman , ‘Self-Defensive Force against Cyber Attacks: Legal, Strategic and Political Dimensions’, (2013)
89 International Law Studies 109, at 112; Jensen, supra note 115, at 230; M.R. Shulman, ‘Discrimination in the
Laws of InformationWarfare’, (1999) 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 939, at 955–6.
121 Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, USA, Nominee for Commander, United States
Cyber Command: Before the S. Armed Services Comm., 111th Cong. 11 (2010).
122 H.H. Koh, Remarks at the U.S. Cyber Command Inter-Agency Legal Conference: International Law in Cy-
berspace (Sept. 18, 2012). Koh offered several examples of the types of cyber attacks that would trigger
self-defence rights: cyber events that trigger a nuclear plant meltdown; intrusions that open a dam above a
populated area causing destruction, or operations disabling air trafﬁc control causing airplane crashes.
123 Published by The Guardian 7 June 2013, at: www.guardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/07/obama-
cyber-directive-full-text.
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networkdefenseor lawenforcementmeasuresare insufﬁcientor cannotbeput inplace
in time to mitigate a threat[,] . . . or if [senior ofﬁcials determine that DCEO] provides
an advantageous degree of effectiveness, timeliness, or efﬁciency compared to other
measures commensurate with the risks.124
Following the emerging customary restrictivist approach to cyber attacks, however,
the directive also emphasizes that ‘[t]he United States Government shall conduct
DCEOwith the least intrusivemethods feasible tomitigate a threat.’125 In important
respects, therefore, U.S. policy on cyber security appears to embrace central tenets
of customary restrictivism, permitting the use of force only if such action is strictly
necessary to ward off or prevent an imminent attack, and only if forcible measures
represent the least harmful means for preventing grave injury.
Ina further signofconvergencebetweentheEuropeanandAmericanpositionson
cyberdefense,NATOstatescollectivelyendorsedtheeffects testata recentsummit in
SouthWales. The resulting declaration of 5 September 2014, proclaims that a cyber-
attack on any NATOmember could trigger a collective response from all of its allies
under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.126 According to the declaration, ‘cyber
attacks can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity,
security, and stability. Their impact could be as harmful to modern societies as
a conventional attack.’127 By accepting the effects-test, NATO member states also
implicitly accepted the idea that the effects-based ‘threshold’ would also serve as a
limitationon theuseof force in response to cyber attacks. Less clear on the faceof the
declaration is whether NATO members also accept the full panoply of customary
principles that have been the focus of attention in American legal scholarship.
Although the SouthWales declaration ‘recognises that international law, including
international humanitarian law and the UN Charter, applies to cyberspace’,128 it
does not specify any particular customary norms that would constrain member
states’ recourse to force. Nonetheless, the fact thatNATOmember stateswere able to
reach a consensus on the effects test as a justiﬁcation for collective military action
at least suggests the possibility for a similar consensus on a customary-restrictivist
approach to self-defence against cyber-attacks.
Whatever the transatlantic convergence on cyber-attacks and self-defence, the
U.S. government and American scholars employ a form of customary restrictivism
in extending concepts of necessity, distinction, and proportionality to modulate
the response to an attack, whether kinetic or non-kinetic.129 This focus on context-
sensitive customary principles rather than formal interpretation of the Charter
reﬂects deeper trends in the United States’s common-law culture, as shaped by
the conﬂuence of legal realism and common-law constitutionalism. Rather than
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Wales SummitDeclaration, Issued by theHeads of State andGovernment Participating in theNorthAtlantic
Summit inWales, Sep. 5, 2014, para. 72, at www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ofﬁcial_texts_112964.htm.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Koh, supra note 121, at 5; M.N. Schmitt, ‘Cyber Operations in International Law: The Use of Force, Collective
Security, Self-Defense, andArmedConﬂicts’, inH. Lin (ed.), Proceedings of aWorkshop onDeterringCyberattacks
(2009), 151 at 167;Waxman, supra note 119, at 112.
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interpret the Charter’s international regime for the use of force as a static code,
American legal scholars tend to approachArticle 51 as a device for facilitating global
coordination in the continuing development of customary jus ad bellum. Although
concepts such as ‘armed attack’ offer a starting point for analysis, American legal
scholars generally accept that the international regime for the use of force is a
product of the international community’s dynamic consensus, andmust be allowed
to adapt to meet the international community’s shifting needs – including the
need to address the new threats posed by cyber attacks. What remains constant
for American legal scholars are those customary constraints that represent basic
safeguardsagainst theabuseof statepower: general legalprinciples suchasnecessity,
proportionality, imminence, reasoned deliberation, and robust burdens of proof.
That US policymakers and legal scholars have embraced these principles in the
cyber context so rapidly and with such broad agreement reveals just how deeply
customary restrictivism has become engrained in US legal culture.
6. CONCLUSION
Conventional restrictivists conceive of the UN Charter’s collective security regime
as a seamless code for the use of force. The language of Article 51, on this view,
precisely deﬁnes the circumstances in which states may invoke a right of self-
defence. Legal scholars in the United States, however, have been more receptive to
the idea that Article 51 serves to preserve a customary right of self-defence that
continues to evolve over time, adapting to new challenges and threats, through the
steady accretion of state practice and opinio juris. For customary restrictivists in the
United States, it is the principles of customary jus ad bellum –not the formal terms of
Article 51 – that provide international law’s primary constraints on the use of force.
Dynamic customary requirements of necessity, proportionality, public deliberation,
and robust burdens of proof deﬁne themetes and bounds of a state’s ‘inherent right
of self-defence’ under Article 51.
Of course, whether the jus ad bellum principles endorsed as custom by American
restrictivists actually satisfy the traditional criteria for customary international law
remains a matter of vigorous debate. We have not attempted to resolve the debate
in this article. Nor have we taken a position here onwhether the traditional criteria
set forth in the Statute of the International Court of Justice130 accurately capture
how states, international courts, and other global actors identify customary norms
in practice.131 Rather, this article’s modest contribution has been to highlight how
American restrictivist scholars have focused on customary jus ad bellum as their
preferred vehicle for subjecting the use of force to the rule of law. These efforts have
reinforced traditional principles of proportionality, imminence, and necessity, but
they have also generated new norms such as the emerging requirement that states
130 Art. 38, UN Charter.
131 See C.A. Bradley, A State Preferences Account of Customary International Law Adjudication, available
at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508298 (casting doubt on the traditional formula and
suggesting a new approach expressly modeled on common law adjudication).
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must make their case for military action to the international community based
on ‘clear and convincing evidence’. While US scholars are not unique in stressing
the importance of customary norms governing the use of force, their commitment
to reﬁne existing customary norms and develop new norms as an alternative to
adopting limiting interpretations of the Charter reﬂects a characteristically Amer-
ican strategy for balancing legal continuity and change.
For decades, American legal scholars have argued that aspects of conventional
restrictivismarepoliticallyunsustainable.Whena state faces agenuinely imminent
and existential threat to its national security, the thinking goes, national authorities
will not hesitate to use force in self-defence – even if the threatened attack has not
yet begun or cannot be attributed to a state. Many US scholars have suggested that
state practice following 9/11 supports this thesis. Confrontedwith such arguments,
conventional restrictivists typically object that violations of theCharter – nomatter
how frequent or widespread – do not undermine the authority of the Charter’s
requirements.132 Yet the less credence states accord to conventional restrictivism,
themoreweightcustomary jusadbellumwillbeaskedtobearasaconstraintonstates’
recourse to force. As this article has shown, the US government has endorsed core
features of customary restrictivism, even as it has adamantly rejected conventional
restrictivism.While the United States may be somewhat exceptional in this regard,
it is hardly unique; other states with legal systems shaped by the common law
tradition such as Australia, Israel, and the United Kingdom have followed a similar
course. At the time of this writing, it seems possible that the gravitational pull of
this growing body of state practice and opinio juriswill eventually bend continental
European approaches to self-defence into the same orbit. Indeed, as we have seen,
recent developments in the law of counterterrorism and cyber security suggest that
this process may already be underway. Conventional restrictivists in Europe would
do well, therefore, to engage directly with American legal scholarship on the use
of force, if only to have a voice in the progressive development of customary jus ad
bellum.
132 See, e.g., Kammerhofer, supra note 8, at 641 (arguing that even if customary international law offers a wider
birth to self-defense than the Charter, this ‘does not help in justifying a prima facie breach of Article 2(4)’).
